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Abstract
In certain applications based on multimodal interaction it may be crucial to deter-
mine not only what the user is doing (commands), but who is doing it, in order
to prevent fraudulent use of the system. The biometric technology, and partic-
ularly the multimodal biometric systems, represent a highly efficient automatic
recognition solution for this type of applications.
Although multimodal biometric systems have been traditionally regarded as
more secure than unimodal systems, their vulnerabilities to spoofing attacks have
been recently shown. New fusion techniques have been proposed and their perfor-
mance thoroughly analysed in an attempt to increase the robustness of multimodal
systems to these spoofing attacks. However, the vulnerabilities of multimodal
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approaches to software-based attacks still remain unexplored. In this work we
present the first software attack against multimodal biometric systems. Its per-
formance is tested against a multimodal system based on face and iris, showing
the vulnerabilities of the system to this new type of threat. Score quantization is
afterwards studied as a possible countermeasure, managing to cancel the effects
of the proposed attacking methodology under certain scenarios.
Keywords:
Multimodal system, security, vulnerabilities, hill-climbing, countermeasures.
1. Introduction1
Multimodal systems represent a new direction for computing that embraces2
users’ natural behaviour as the center of human-computer interaction [1]. As with3
any other novel discipline, the research community is just beginning to understand4
how to design robust and well integrated multimodal systems. But only trough5
multidisciplinary cooperation among those with expertise in individual compo-6
nent technologies can multimodal systems reach its final aim: building more gen-7
eral and robust systems that will reshape daily computing tasks and have signifi-8
cant commercial impact [2].9
One of the main areas of research in multimodal interaction, where specific ex-10
pertise is needed, is recognition, generally regarded as a form of processing users’11
commands. However, for certain applications based on multimodal interaction, a12
second form of recognition is crucial: it is not only necessary to distinguish what13
the user is doing, but who is doing it, so that non-authorized individuals cannot use14
the system. For these cases, a robust personal automatic recognition solution such15
as the one provided by biometrics is required. Although being relatively young16
compared to other mature and long-used security technologies, biometrics have17
3
emerged in the last decade as a pushing alternative for applications where auto-18
matic recognition of people is needed. Certainly, biometrics are very attractive19
and useful for the final user: forget about PINs and passwords, you are your own20
key [3, 4]. However, we cannot forget that as any technology aimed to provide21
a security service, biometric systems are exposed to external attacks which could22
compromise their integrity [5]. Thus, it is of special relevance to understand the23
threats to which they are subjected and to analyse their vulnerabilities in order to24
prevent possible attacks and increase their benefits for the users.25
External attacks to biometric systems are commonly divided into: direct at-26
tacks (also known as spoofing attacks), carried out against the sensor, and indirect27
attacks, directed to some of the inner modules of the system. In the last recent28
years important research efforts have been conducted to study the vulnerabilities29
of biometric systems to both direct and indirect attacks [6, 7, 8, 9].30
This new concern which has arisen in the biometric community regarding the31
security of biometric systems has led to the appearance of several international32
projects, like the European Tabula Rasa [10], which base their research on the33
security through transparency principle [11, 12]: in order to make biometric sys-34
tems more secure and reliable, their vulnerabilities need to be analysed and useful35
countermeasures need to be developed.36
In this scenario, biometric multimodality has been regarded as an effective37
way of increasing the robustness of biometric-based security systems to external38
attacks. Combining the information offered by several traits would force an even-39
tual intruder to successfully break several unimodal modules instead of just one.40
However, it has already been proven that this is not necessary in spoofing attacks:41
breaking into the module based on the most accurate biometric trait grants access42
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to the multimodal system in many occasions [13, 14, 15].43
In addition to research works which address the vulnerabilities of multimodal44
systems to spoofing attacks [13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20], different studies45
may be found in the literature regarding the analysis of indirect attacks against46
unimodal systems [8, 9, 21]. However, the problem of whether multimodal ap-47
proaches are vulnerable or not to software-based attacking methodologies still48
remains unexplored.49
In the present work we propose and analyse a general multimodal indirect at-50
tack, which can be used to study the vulnerabilities of biometric systems based on51
different number of traits, different fusion strategies and different types of tem-52
plates (e.g., real valued, binary). Without loss of generality, the attack is applied53
to the particular case of a face- and iris-based recognition system. This trait com-54
bination is regarded as one of the most popular and user-friendly, since the acqui-55
sition of both traits can be transparent to the user [22, 23, 24, 25]. This provides56
a straight-forward integration of both modalities, a complex topic on multimodal57
computation [26]. Furthermore, the experimental protocol used is fully replicable,58
so that the results obtained can be fairly compared.59
Score quantization is studied afterwards as a possible countermeasure against60
the proposed attack. Two different approaches are analysed: quantizing the score61
before and after the fusion of the partial face and iris scores. While the second62
scheme barely reduces the success rate and efficiency of the attack, the first one63
succeeds in preventing an intruder from breaking into the system.64
Thus, following the same transparency principle which is starting to prevail in65
the biometric community through European Projects such as Tabula Rasa [11, 12],66
the main objectives and contributions of the present work are: i) proposal of a67
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fully novel software-based attacking methodology against multimodal systems,68
ii) study of the vulnerabilities of a realistic multimodal system to the previous at-69
tack under a replicable scenario, iii) comparison of the performance of the attack70
to that obtained against the unimodal modules in order to determine if the mul-71
timodal approach increases the security of the system against this type of threat,72
and iv) study of some biometric-based countermeasures which may prevent such73
an attack.74
The paper is structured as follows. Related works are summarised in Sect. 2.75
The novel multimodal attacking algorithm used to evaluate the system is presented76
in Sect. 3. Then the multimodal verification system evaluated is described in77
Sect. 4. The database and experimental protocol followed are presented in Sect. 5.78
In Sect. 6 we describe and analyse the results obtained. Score quantization is79
studied as a possible countermeasure in Sect. 7. Conclusions are finally drawn in80
Sect. 8.81
2. Related Works82
In 2001, Ratha et al. identified and classified in a biometric recognition sys-83
tem eight possible points of attack [27]. These vulnerable points can be broadly84
divided into direct and indirect attacks.85
Direct attacks. Also known as spoofing-attacks, these are attacks at the sensor86
level, carried out with synthetic biometric traits, such as gummy fingers or high87
quality printed iris images, and thus requiring no knowledge for the attacker of88
the inner parts of the system (matching algorithm used, feature extraction method,89
template format, etc.) Some research regarding the vulnerabilities of multimodal90
systems to these attacks has been carried out over the last recent years: in 2005,91
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Chetty andWagner [14] tested the performance of spoofing attacks against a novel92
multimodal system based on face and voice; in 2009, Tan [28] investigated meth-93
ods for increasing the security of multimodal systems based on face and voice94
against spoofing attacks; in 2010 [16] and 2011 [15], Rodrigues et al. evaluated95
the vulnerabilities of a multimodal system based on face and fingerprint, using96
different fusion techniques and proposing new ones; in 2010, Johnson et al. [19]97
analysed the effect of spoofing attacks against a multimodal system based on face98
and iris, proposing a method for the vulnerabilities assessment of these systems;99
later in 2010, Marasco [20] analysed the security risks in multimodal biometric100
systems based on face and fingerprint coming from spoofing attacks; in 2011, Ak-101
thar et al. [13, 17] used real rather than simulated spoof samples for the evaluation102
of the vulnerabilities of a multimodal system based on fingerprint, face and iris,103
proposing a new learning algorithm able to improve the security offered by the104
system against spoofing attacks. All these works have proven that combining sev-105
eral traits in one system for person authentication does not necessarily increment106
the security offered against spoofing attacks, since the system can be bypassed by107
breaking only one of the unimodal traits.108
Indirect attacks. These attacks are directed to the inner modules of the system109
and can be further divided into three groups, namely: i) attacks to the communi-110
cation channels between modules of the system, extracting, adding or changing111
information; ii) attacks to the feature extractor and the matcher may be carried112
out using a Trojan Horse that bypasses the corresponding module; and iii) at-113
tacks to the system database which manipulate it in order to gain access to the114
application, by changing, adding or deleting a template. While for direct attacks115
the intruder needed no knowledge about the inner modules of the system, this116
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Figure 1: Diagram of a general hill-climbing attack (top), with the specific modification scheme
for the combined algorithm (bottom).
knowledge is a main requisite here, together with access to some of the system117
components (database, feature extractor, matcher, etc.). Most of these indirect118
attacks are based on some variation of a hill-climbing algorithm, consisting on119
iteratively changing some synthetically generated templates until access to the120
system is granted. Even though some research has been done in this area using121
unimodal systems [8, 9, 21, 29], to the best of our knowledge there is no previ-122
ous analysis of the vulnerabilities of multimodal biometric systems to this kind of123
attacks.124
3. Proposed Attack125
Until now, only the vulnerabilities of unimodal systems to indirect attacks have126
been analysed. In this section we present the first algorithm for the evaluation of127
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the vulnerabilities of multimodal systems to this type of threat. As can be observed128
in Fig. 1 (top), the input to the algorithm are the scores given by the matcher, and129
the output the templates to be compared to the client account.130
For simplicity, the attacking methodology is described here for the particu-131
lar case of a multimodal system based on the score fusion of a real valued (e.g.132
face) and a binary (e.g. iris) matcher. However, the proposed approach is general133
and may be applied with very small modifications to attack multimodal systems134
working on: i) more than two traits represented with real-valued or binary tem-135
plates (by adding new blocks after the switch in Fig. 1), or ii) feature-based fusion136
strategies (by rearranging the template disposition).137
In order to attack a multimodal biometric system where one of the biometric138
traits is represented with real values and the other is binary (most iris recognition139
systems work on binary templates), the algorithm here presented combines two140
sub-algorithms. Each of them attacks one segment of the template: the real-valued141
or the binary segment. In the following subsections, each of the individual sub-142
algorithms is described. Finally, the multimodal attacking algorithm based on the143
previous two models is presented.144
3.1. Sub-Algorithm 1: Hill-Climbing based on the Uphill Simplex Algorithm145
Problem statement. Consider the problem of finding aK-dimensional vector146
of real values xface which, compared to an unknown template Cface (in our case re-147
lated to a specific client), produces a similarity score bigger than a certain thresh-148
old face, according to some matching function Jface, i.e., Jface(Cface; xface) > face.149
The template can be another K-dimensional vector or a generative model of K-150
dimensional vectors.151
Assumptions. Let us assume:152
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 That there exists a statistical model G (K-variate Gaussian with mean G153
and a diagonal covariance matrix G, with 2G = diag(G)), in our case154
related to a background set of users, overlapping to some extent with Cface.155
 That we have access to the evaluation of the matching function Jface(Cface; xface)156
for several trials of xface.157
Algorithm. The problem stated above can be solved by adapting the Downhill158
Simplex algorithm first presented in [30] to maximize instead of minimize the159
function Jface. We iteratively form new simplices by reflecting one point, xlface, in160
the hyperplane of the remaining points, until we are close enough to the maximum161
of the function. The point to be reflected will always be the one with the lowest162
value given by the matching function, since it is in principle the one furthest from163
our objective. Thus, as can be observed in Fig. 2, the different steps followed by164
the sub-algorithm 1 are:165
1. Compute the statistical modelG(G; G) from a development pool of users.166
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2. Take K + 1 samples (xiface) defining the initial simplex from the statistical167
model G and compute the similarity scores Jface(Cface; xiface) = siface, with168
i = 1; : : : ; K + 1.169
3. Compute the centroid xface of the simplex as the average of xiface: xface =170
1
K+1
P
i x
i
face.171
4. Reflect the point xlface according to the next steps, adapted from the Down-172
hill Simplex algorithm [30]. In the following, the indices l and h are defined173
as h = argmaxi(siface), l = argmini(s
i
face).174
4. a) Reflection: Given a constant  > 0, the reflection coefficient, we
compute:
a = (1 + )xface   xlface:
Thus, a is on the line between xlface and xface being  the ratio between175
the distances [axface] and [xlfacexface]. If s
l
face < s
a
face < s
h
face we replace176
xlface by a. Otherwise, we go on to step 4b.177
4. b) Expansion or contraction.178
i. Expansion: If saface > shface (i.e., we have a new maximum) we
expand a to b as follows:
b = a+ (1  )xface;
where  > 1 is another constant called expansion coefficient,179
which represents the ratio between the distances [bxface] and [sxface].180
If sbface > s
h
face, we replace x
l
face by b. Otherwise, we have a failed181
expansion and replace xlface by a.182
ii. Contraction: If we have reached this step, then saface  slface (i.e.
replacing xlface by a would leave s
a
face as the new minimum). We
11
compute
b = xlface + (1  )xface;
where 0 <  < 1 is the contraction coefficient, defined as the183
ratio between the distances [bxface] and [xlfacexface]. If s
b
face >184
max(slface; s
a
face), then we replace x
l
face by b; otherwise, the con-185
tracted point is worse than xlface, and for such a failed contraction186
we replace all the xiface’s by (x
i
face + x
h
face)=2.187
5. With the new xlface value, update the simplex and return to step 3.188
Stopping criteria. The algorithm stops when: i) the maximum similarity189
score of the simplex vertices is higher than the threshold face (i.e., the account is190
broken), ii) the variation of the similarity scores obtained in a number of itera-191
tions is lower than a certain threshold or iii) a maximum number of iterations is192
reached.193
Additional note. It is important to notice for the computation of the Efficiency194
(defined in Sect. 5.3) of this sub-algorithm that at each iteration (except for the195
initial one) a maximum of 2 matchings will be performed (i.e., saface + s
b
face). On196
average, the number of matchings computed per iteration will be lower than 2 and197
greater than 1.198
The hill-climbing based on the Uphill Simplex algorithm was first presented in199
[31], where it was used to successfully attack a signature verification system. The200
performance of the proposed algorithm showed a clear improvement in the attack-201
ing capabilities with respect to previously proposed state-of-the-art approaches,202
which motivated its choice for the present multimodal vulnerability study.203
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3.2. Sub-Algorithm 2: Indirect Attack based on a Genetic Algorithm204
Problem statement. Consider the problem of finding an L-dimensional bi-205
nary vector xiris which, compared to an unknown template Ciris (in our case related206
to a specific client), produces a similarity score bigger than a certain threshold iris,207
according to some matching function Jiris, i.e., Jiris(Ciris; xiris) > iris. The tem-208
plate can be another L-dimensional vector or a generative model of L-dimensional209
vectors.210
Assumptions. Let us assume:211
 That we have access to the evaluation of the matching function Jiris(Ciris; xiris)212
for several trials of xiris.213
Algorithm. The problem stated above may be solved by using a genetic algo-214
rithm, which has shown a remarkable performance in binary optimization prob-215
lems [32], to optimize the similarity score given by the matcher, that is, the fitness216
value for an individual is siris = Jiris(xiris; Ciris). As can be seen in Fig. 3 the steps217
followed by the sub-algorithm 2 are:218
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1. Generate an initial population Pi with N individuals of length L, L being219
the length of the iris code.220
2. Compute the similarity scores si of the individuals (xiiris) of the population221
Pi, si = J(xiiris; Ciris) with i = 1; : : : ; N .222
3. Four rules are used at each iteration to create the next generation Pn of223
individuals from the current population:224
3. a) Elite: the two individuals with the maximum similarity scores are kept225
unaltered for the next generation.226
3. b) Selection: certain individuals, the parents, are chosen by stochastic227
universal sampling [33]. This way, the individuals with the highest fit-228
ness values (similarity scores) are more likely to be chosen as parents229
for the next generation: one subject can be selected from 0 to many230
times. From the original N individuals, N=2  1 fathers and N=2  1231
mothers are chosen.232
3. c) Crossover: parents are combined to form the N   2 children of the233
next generation, following a scattered crossover method. A random234
binary vector is created and the genes (bits) of the child are selected235
from the first parent where the value of the random vector is 1, and236
from the second when it is 0 (vice versa for the second child).237
3. d) Mutation: random changes are applied to the bit values of the new238
children with a mutation probability pm.239
4. Redefine Pi = Pn and return to step 2.240
Stopping criteria. The algorithm stops when: i) the best fitness score is241
higher than the threshold iris (i.e., the account is broken), ii) the variation of the242
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similarity scores obtained in a number of generations is lower than a previously243
fixed value, or iii) when the maximum number of generations is reached.244
Additional note. It is important to notice for the computation of the Efficiency245
(defined in Sect. 5.3) of this sub-algorithm that at each iteration (i.e., generation)246
N matchings are performed (one for each of the members of the population).247
This particular implementation of a genetic algorithm was first presented in248
[34], where it was used to analyse the vulnerabilities of the same iris recogni-249
tion system considered in this work. The performance of the proposed algorithm250
showed a very high attacking potential with very encouraging results and was the251
first one, to our knowledge, working on a binary input (such as the iriscodes).252
Therefore, its use as part of the global multimodal attack presented here seemed253
like a promising choice.254
3.3. Multimodal Attack: Combination of Sub-Algorithms 1 (Uphill-Simplex) and255
2 (Genetic-Algorithm)256
Problem statement. Consider the problem of finding a (K +L)-dimensional257
vector x of real and binary values which, compared to an unknown template C258
(in our case related to a specific client), produces a similarity score bigger than259
a certain threshold , according to some matching function J , i.e., J(C; x) > .260
The template can be another (K + L)-dimensional vector or a generative model261
of (K + L)-dimensional vectors.262
Assumptions. Let us assume:263
 That we know the distribution of the two subtemplates (real-valued xface264
and binary xiris) within the multimodal template x.265
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 That we have access to the evaluation of the matching function J(C; x) for266
several trials of x.267
Algorithm. The problem stated above may be solved by dividing the template268
x into its real-valued (xface) and binary parts (xiris) and alternately optimize each269
of them as can be seen in Fig. 1. In order to optimize each of the parts, the270
algorithms described in the previous subsections are used: the Sub-Algorithm 1271
for the real-valued segment (face) and the Sub-Algorithm 2 for the binary segment272
(iris). Thus, the steps followed are:273
1. Generate a synthetic template (x) randomly initializing the real-valued (xface)274
and binary (xiris) segments, and compute the similarity score S = J(C; x),275
which will be used as optimization criterion.276
2. Leaving one of the segments unaltered, optimize the other segment of the277
template using the appropriate sub-algorithm until one of the stopping cri-278
teria of the sub-algorithm is fulfilled.279
3. Change the optimization target to the segment which was previously left280
unaltered and go back to step 2.281
Stopping criteria. The algorithm stops when: i) the verification threshold is282
reached (i.e., access to the system is granted) or ii) the total number of iterations283
(i.e., changes between the optimized segments) exceeds a previously fixed value284
(i.e., the attack has failed).285
Additional note. As will be analysed in the experimental section this algo-286
rithm may present different results depending on whether it starts attacking the287
real-valued or binary part of the template.288
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It is very important to notice that the multimodal attacking algorithm does not289
have access at any point to the partial scores of the unimodal modules (sface and290
siris) but only uses the final fused score given by the system (S). This way, in the291
description of the previous two sub-algorithms, sface ad siris should be changed by292
S when they are used as part of the multimodal attack and not individually.293
Both attacking sub-algorithms stop when the improvement of the final multi-294
modal score saturates (i.e., the variation of the multimodal similarity scores ob-295
tained in a number of iterations or generations is lower than a certain threshold).296
This “switching” methodology is preferred over a “sequential” approach based on297
the assumption that once the algorithm has saturated attacking one of the unimodal298
subsystems, further changes in the other modality will lead to new improvements299
in the final multimodal score.300
4. Multimodal Verification System Attacked301
The multimodal verification system evaluated in this work is the fusion of two302
unimodal systems, namely: i) a modified version of the iris recognition system303
developed by L. Masek2 [35], which is widely used in many iris related publica-304
tions; and ii) an Eigenface-based face verification system [36], used to present305
initial face verification results for the recent Face Recognition Grand Challenge306
[37].307
4.1. Face Verification System308
The system evaluated uses Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP) and a cascade of309
Haar-like classifiers in order to segment the faces in the images, together with310
2The source can be freely downloaded fromwww.csse.uwa.edu.au/ pk/studentprojects/libor/sourcecode.html
17
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the position of the eyes on them. Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is used311
afterwards so that face images can be represented in a lower dimensional space [8].312
80% of the variance is retained when training the PCA vector space with cropped313
face images of size 6480, reducing the original 5120-dimensional space to only314
100 dimensions or eigenvectors.315
Finally, the similarity scores are computed in this PCA vector space using the316
Euclidean distance.317
4.2. Iris Verification System318
The system comprises four different steps, namely: i) segmentation, where319
the method proposed in [38] is followed, modelling the iris and pupil bound-320
aries as circles; ii) normalization, using a technique based on Daugman’s ruber321
sheet model that maps the segmented iris region into a 2D array [39]; iii) fea-322
ture encoding, which produces a binary template of 20  480 = 9; 600 bits and323
the corresponding noise mark (representing the eyelids areas) by convolving the324
normalized iris patter with 1D Log-Gabor wavelets; and iv) matching, where the325
inverse of a modified Hamming distance is used, which takes into account the326
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noise mask bits.327
This way, the similarity score between two templates is computed as 1=HD
(so that a higher score implies a higher degree of similarity):
HD =
PL
j=1Xj(XOR)Yj(AND)
Xnj(AND) Y nj
L PLk=1Xnk(OR)Y nk
where Xj and Yj are the two bitwise templates to compare, Xnj and Y nj are the328
corresponding noise masks for Xj and Yj , and L is the number of bits comprised329
in each template. Xnj denotes the logical not operation applied to Xnj .330
4.3. Multimodal Verification System331
Given an input vector x, the system performs the following tasks in order to332
obtain the final score, S, as can be seen in Fig. 4:333
1. Compute the similarity scores obtained by the face (sface) and iris (siris)334
traits, as given by the matchers described in Sect. 4.1 and Sect. 4.2.335
2. Normalize the scores sk, with k = fface; irisg, using hyperbolic tangent
estimators (its robustness and high efficiency are proven in [40]):
s0k =
1
2

tanh

0:01
sk   


+ 1

where sk is the original similarity score obtained by the iris (respectively336
face) section of the template,  and  the mean and standard deviation of337
the scores distribution of the iris (respectively face), and s0k the normalised338
score. This way, both partial scores (face and iris) lie in the interval [0; 1].339
3. Finally, both normalised scores are fused with a sum, given the very good
results that this fusion rule has presented even when compared with more
sophisticated methods like decision trees [41] or neural networks [22]:
S = s0iris + s
0
face
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There may be other fusion strategies that can improve the performance of340
the multimodal system. However, simple summation gives very good re-341
sults, and it is not the scope of the paper to find the optimal fusion strategy.342
5. Database and Experimental Protocol343
Prior to any vulnerability assessment study a performance evaluation of the344
systems being attacked should be carried out. The performance evaluation will345
permit to determine how good is the system and, more important, the operating346
points where it will be attacked as the success chances of this kind of attacking347
algorithms are, in principle, highly dependent on the False Acceptance and False348
Rejection rates of the system. While the FRRmeasures the probability of rejecting349
a genuine user, the FAR gives a measure of the probability of an impostor being350
taken as a genuine user. Therefore, in general, the higher the FAR, the easier for an351
eventual attacker to break into the system. Moreover, for the particular case of the352
proposed method, attacking the system at a lower FAR implies reaching a higher353
threshold, which leads to a decrease on the success chances of the algorithm.354
Furthermore, defining the operating points will enable us to compare, in a355
more fair fashion, the vulnerabilities of the different systems to the same attack356
(i.e., we can determine for a given FAR or FRR which of them is less/more robust357
to the attacking approach).358
Both the database and the protocol used for the performance and security eval-359
uations of the multimodal system are the same ones used for the evaluation of360
the unimodal subsystems, so that the results are fully comparable. This way, we361
will be able to determine whether the multimodality enhances the system security362
against the proposed attacking approaches with respect to the unimodal traits.363
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5.1. Database364
The experiments are carried out on the face and iris subcorpora included in365
the Desktop Dataset of the multimodal BioSecure database [42], which comprises366
voice, fingerprints, face, iris, signature and hand of 210 users, captured in two367
time-spaced acquisition sessions. This database was acquired thanks to the joint368
effort of 11 European institutions and has become one of the standard benchmarks369
for biometric performance and security evaluations [43]. It is publicly available370
through the BioSecure Foundation3.371
The database comprises three datasets captured under different acquisition372
scenarios, namely: i) Internet Dataset (DS1, captured through the Internet in an373
unsupervised setup), ii) Desktop Dataset (DS2, captured in an office-like envi-374
ronment with human supervision), and iii) the Mobile Dataset (DS3, acquired on375
mobile devices with uncontrolled conditions). The face subset used in this work376
includes four frontal images (two per session) with an homogeneous grey back-377
ground, and captured with a reflex digital camera without flash (210  4 = 840378
face samples), while the iris subset includes four grey-scale images (two per ses-379
sion as well) per eye, all captured with the Iris Access EOU3000 sensor from LG.380
In the experiments only the right eye of each user has been considered, leading381
this way as in the face case to 210 4 = 840 iris samples.382
5.2. Performance evaluation383
As the iris and face subcorpus present identical sample distributions, the pro-384
tocol followed for the performance evaluation of the unimodal modules and the385
multimodal system is the same. As can be seen in Fig. 5, each subcorpus of the386
3http://biosecure.it-sudparis.eu/AB
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Figure 5: Partition of the BioSecure DS2 DB according to the performance evaluation protocol
defined.
database is divided in two sets, namely: i) a training set comprising the first three387
samples of 170 clients, used as the enrolment templates; ii) a test set formed by388
the fourth image of the 170 clients above (used to compute the genuine scores)389
and the 4 images of the remaining 40 users (used to compute the impostor scores).390
As a result of: i) using the same subjects for PCA training and client enrol-391
ment for the face verification subsystem, and ii) manually segmenting those eyes392
that were not successfully segmented automatically (3.04%), the system perfor-393
mance is optimistically biased, and therefore harder to attack than in a practical394
situation (in which the enrolled clients may not have been used for PCA training395
and the image segmentation would be fully automatic). This means that the results396
presented in this paper are a conservative estimate of the attack’s performance.397
The final score given by the system is the average of the scores obtained after398
matching the input template to the three face and iris templates of the client model399
C. Table 1 shows that the ERR of the unimodal face and iris modules and of the400
whole multimodal system computed according to the protocol described above.401
In this chart we can observe that: i) the performance of the unimodal modules is402
not noticeably affected by score normalization (i.e., the EER barely changes after403
normalising the scores), and ii) the performance of the multimodal system (0.83%404
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Table 1: EER of the unimodal and multimodal systems, based on face and iris, before and after
the normalization of the scores.
EER (%)
Face Iris Multimodal
Before Norm. 6.55 4.11 -
After Norm. 6.61 4.04 0.83
EER) clearly improves that of the unimodal systems (4% and 6% respectively). In405
Fig. 6 the Detection Error Tradeoff (DET) curves of the unimodal and multimodal406
systems obtained using the described protocol are shown. As can be seen, the407
multimodal system clearly outperforms both unimodal systems at all points.408
5.3. Experimental Protocol for the Attacks409
The user accounts to be attacked by the algorithm are generated with the train-410
ing set defined in the performance evaluation protocol (i.e., the first three sam-411
ples of the 170 users in Fig. 5). The performance of the attack is evaluated in412
terms of: i) its Success Rate (SR) or expected probability of bypassing the sys-413
tem, computed as the ratio SR = AB=AT , where AB is the number of broken414
accounts and AT is the total number of attacked accounts; and ii) its Efficiency415
(Eff), or inverse of the average number of comparisons needed to break an ac-416
count, Eff = 1=
PAB
i=1 ni=AB

, where ni is the number of comparisons made to417
bypass the ith account, with i = 1; : : : ; AB.418
It has to be emphasized that the Eff is computed in terms of the number of419
matchings performed by the attacking algorithm and not according to the number420
of iterations needed (i.e., two algorithms performing the same number of itera-421
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Figure 6: DET curves of the unimodal and multimodal systems.
tions to break an account do not necessarily have the same Eff).422
The SR gives an estimation of how dangerous the attack is: the higher the SR,423
the bigger the threat. On the other hand, the Eff tells us how easy it is for the424
attack to bypass the system in terms of speed: the higher the Eff, the faster the425
attack.426
The different attacks have been evaluated at three operating points which cor-427
respond to FAR = 0.1%, FAR = 0.05% and FAR = 0.01%, which, according to428
[44], offer a low, medium and high security level.429
6. Results: Attack Performance430
The objectives of this first study of the vulnerabilities of a multimodal system431
to an indirect attack are: i) to evaluate the performance of the proposed attack-432
ing methodology, and ii) to test whether the use of two different biometric traits433
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Table 2: Eff and SR for the Sub-Algorithm 1 (Uphill-Simplex) and Sub-Algorithm 2 (Genetic Al-
gorithm) attacks carried out against the corresponding unimodal systems, and for the Multimodal
Attack against the multimodal system.
Unimodal Attacks Multimodal Attack
FAR
Sub-Alg. 1 vs Face Sub-Alg. 2 vs Iris Starts Face Starts Iris
SR Eff (10 4) SR Eff (10 4) SR Eff (10 4) SR Eff (10 4)
0.10% 100% 22.472 91.18% 1.400 100% 1.9372 100% 1.4180
0.05% 100% 22.124 80.89% 1.255 100% 1.8218 100% 1.3585
0.01% 100% 21.930 62.36% 1.102 100% 1.3702 100% 1.1112
increments the security level and robustness of the system to this kind of attacks.434
In the first set of experiments, the performance of the two attacking sub-435
algorithms against the unimodal systems is studied, so that later a comparison436
between the unimodal and the multimodal systems can be established. In the sec-437
ond set, the performance of the attack against the multimodal system is tested.438
Score quantization is afterwards analysed as a possible countermeasure, studying439
its impact in the SR and the Eff of the multimodal attacking scheme.440
6.1. Sub-Algorithm 1 vs Face Verification System441
The performance of the Sub-Algorithm 1 against the unimodal system based442
on eigenfaces is tested at the three operating points mentioned before, namely: i)443
FAR = 0.10%, ii) FAR = 0.05%, iii) FAR = 0.01%. The results of the experi-444
ments are detailed in Table 2, where we can observe that the algorithm success-445
fully breaks all the attacked accounts. Also worth noting that for this attack the446
efficiency remains almost invariant, regardless of the operating point considered.447
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It should also be emphasized that in the present work the hill-climbing attack448
is initialized from a normal distribution of zero mean and unit variance, that is,449
the first simplex is generated without needing any training faces, contrary to what450
happened in other state of the art attacking methods [8]. Furthermore, the param-451
eters ,  and  used here are the same that were optimized in [31] to break a452
signature verification system, which proves the robustness of the algorithm: it is453
able to break totally heterogeneous systems working on different biometric traits454
without adjusting its parameters.455
6.2. Sub-Algorithm 2 vs Iris Verification System456
As before, the performance of the Sub-Algorithm 2 against the unimodal sys-457
tem based on iris is tested at the three operating points mentioned before, namely:458
i) FAR = 0.10%, ii) FAR = 0.05%, iii) FAR = 0.01%. The results of the experi-459
ments are also shown in Table 2, where we can observe that the algorithm is able460
to successfully break more than 90% of the accounts for the point of operation461
corresponding to a low security level, and more than 60% for the point corre-462
sponding to a high security level. As in the previous case the efficiency of the463
attack remains almost invariant, slightly decreasing, as would be expected, for464
higher security points where the attack needs more iterations to break the system465
(i.e., it becomes slower).466
6.3. Combined Attack vs Multimodal System467
We run two sets of experiments, namely: i) the algorithm starts attacking468
the face section of the template (Sub-Algorithm 1), and ii) the algorithm starts469
attacking the iris section (Sub-Algorithm 2). Between 40% and 60% of the times470
that the algorithm starts attacking the iris section of the template it is able to break471
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the account without changing to the face segment. This does not happen when the472
algorithm starts attacking the face segment. This way, as it was already proven for473
spoofing attacks in [13, 15, 19], attacking only the best individual matcher (i.e.,474
the unimodal system with the lowest EER, the iris one in our case) grants in many475
cases access to the system under attack.476
Secondly, in Table 2 we also show the results obtained by the multimodal ap-477
proach when it starts attacking the face segment (randomly initializing the iris478
section) or iris segment (randomly initializing the face section). As can be ob-479
served, in both cases the SR is as high as 100% for all the operating points tested.480
However, the Eff of the attack decreases about 25% when starting with the Sub-481
Algorithm 2 (Genetic Algorithm) compared to the case of starting with the Sub-482
Algorithm 1 (Uphill-Simplex). The reason lies on the Eff of the individual Sub-483
Algorithms. On the left columns of Table 2 (Unimodal Attacks) we can observe484
that the Eff of the Sub-Algorithm 1 is between 15 and 20 times higher than the485
Eff of Sub-Algorithm 2 (for a similar number of iterations performed to break an486
account the number of matchings carried out is significantly higher for the binary487
attack as was presented in Sects. 3.1 and 3.2). When the multimodal algorithm488
starts attacking the iris segment, in many occasions it is able to break the system489
without changing to the face segment. This way, the multimodal attacking algo-490
rithm can not benefit from the higher Eff of the Sub-Algorithm 1, and has a lower491
Eff than that achieved when the attack is started against the face section.492
From the previous observations none of the two main vulnerability scenarios493
considered for the multimodal attack is clearly better than the other. On the one494
hand, when it starts attacking the face segment, it is faster but it needs to use both495
sections of the template to break the system (i.e., face and iris). On the other496
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Figure 7: Evolution of the score in each iteration for two broken accounts in the two different
scenarios studied: the algorithm starts attacking the face section of the template (left) or the iris
section (right). The verification threshold is represented with a dashed horizontal line. In the left
plot, the different phases of the algorithm, alternatively attacking the face and iris sections, are
marked with letters A-D.
hand, when it starts attacking the iris segment, it becomes slower but it has a good497
chance of gaining access to the system using just one of the template sections (i.e.,498
iris) with the advantage that this may entail in terms of simplification of the attack.499
In Table 2 we can also observe that the most robust system in terms of Eff and500
SR is the unimodal system based on iris and not the multimodal approach as would501
be expected. This shows that, as already demonstrated for spoofing attacks [13,502
15, 19], although in general multimodal systems offer a better performance than503
their unimodal subsystems (for our particular case the EER decreases from 5% to504
0.8%), they are not necessarily less vulnerable to software attacks. These results505
reinforce the importance of reporting the SR of the attack always in terms of the506
operating point at which it was evaluated (i.e., FAR), so that a fair comparison507
across different recognition systems may be established.508
Finally, in Fig. 7 the evolution of the score for each iteration of the algorithm509
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can be observed. On the left, the face section of the template is first attacked, and510
several areas with different slopes can be observed (marked with letters A, B, C511
and D), depending on what part of the template is being attacked. In segments512
A and C, it can also be observed that the algorithm switches to attack the other513
section of the template after the score remains almost constant for a fixed number514
of iterations. On the other hand, on the graph on the right, no “steps” can be ob-515
served on the curve: the attack started attacking the iris section and never changed516
to the face segment as the template was successfully broken using only the iris517
part.518
7. Countermeasuring the Attack: Score Quantization519
Given the high vulnerability of the multimodal system evaluated to the com-520
bined attacking algorithm proposed, some attack protection needs to be incorpo-521
rated in order to increase the robustness of the system. When a countermeasure is522
introduced in a biometric system to reduce the risk of a particular attack, it should523
be statistically evaluated considering two main parameters:524
 Impact of the countermeasure in the system performance. The inclusion of525
a particular protection scheme might change the FAR and FRR of a system,526
and these changes should be evaluated and reported (other performance in-527
dicators such as speed or computational efficiency might also change, but528
are not considered here).529
 Performance of the countermeasure, i.e. impact of the countermeasure in530
the SR and Eff of the attack.531
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It is often argued that a simple account lockout policy (i.e., blocking the user532
accounts after a number of consecutive unsuccessful access attempts) would be533
enough to prevent an attack such as the one proposed in the present work. How-534
ever, such countermeasures still leave the system vulnerable to a spyware-based535
attack that interlaces its false attempts with the attempts by genuine users (suc-536
cessful attempts) and collects information over a period of time (i.e. piggyback537
attack). Furthermore, it may be used by the attacker to perform an account lock-538
out attack (i.e., the intruder tries to illegally access a great amount of accounts539
blocking all of them and collapsing the system).540
In this scenario, a specific design of the matching algorithm can also be im-541
plemented in order to reduce the effects of this type of threats, providing this way542
an additional level of security through a biometric-based protection scheme com-543
plementary to other possible non-biometric countermeasures.544
Among the biometric-based approaches to reduce the effects of hill-climbing545
attacks, score quantization has been proposed as an effective countermeasure [29].546
In fact, the BioApi Consortium [45] recommends that biometric algorithms emit547
only quantized matching scores. Such quantization means that small changes in548
the randomly generated templates will normally not result in a modification of the549
matching score, so that the attack does not have the necessary feedback from the550
system to be carried out successfully.551
With this precedents, in this section we analyse the performance of score quan-552
tization as a possible countermeasure against the proposed attack. In the exper-553
iments we will consider the multimodal system operating at a medium security554
operating point (FAR = 0.05%). For the combined attack we will assume the555
same configuration used in the vulnerability assessment experiments.556
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Table 3: Performance (in terms of SR and Eff) of the combined attack against the system consid-
ering different quantization steps (QS), applied before and after the fusion of the scores.
QS 10 4 10 3 10 2 10 1
Before Fusion
SR 100% 100% 0% 0%
Eff (10 4) 1.8932 1.6113 - -
After Fusion
SR 100% 100% 100% 0%
Eff (10 4) 1.7806 1.7921 1.7470 -
Since the global score in this multimodal system is obtained from two previous557
partial (face and iris) scores that are normalised and then fused, the quantization558
can take place either before or after this sum or fusion. Both possible schemes are559
studied in this section.560
In order to select the appropriate quantization step according to the trade-off561
that should be met in terms of its impact on the system performance (ideally as562
small as possible) and on the attack performance (as big as possible), several563
Quantization Steps (QS) are tested in terms of their corresponding Positive Incre-564
ment, PI (i.e., percentage of iterations that produced an increase in the similarity565
score higher than the quantization step considered). The EER of the system with566
the different QS is computed when the quantization is applied before and after567
the score fusion. The QS considered range from 10 8 and 10 1. For the last QS568
(10 1), the EER increases considerably (i.e., the QS is too big), while for the re-569
maining values the performance of the system is not significantly affected. The570
multimodal attack is therefore repeated applying four QS values, namely: i) QS =571
10 4, ii) QS = 10 3, iii) QS = 10 2, and iv) QS = 10 1. The first three QS values572
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guarantee a similar performance of the system, while the last one can be useful for573
very high-security applications, when a lower performance of the system might be574
acceptable if it leads to a much higher protection against the analysed attacks.575
In Table 3 the results of these experiments are shown. As can be seen, the576
quantization of the scores is effective as a countermeasure against the combined577
attacking algorithm presented in this work when it is applied:578
 Before the fusion with a QS = 10 2. Since the rounding effect of quantiz-579
ing the scores and then summing them is bigger than that obtained when580
fusing the scores before applying the quantization, the performance of the581
attack decreases more when applying the quantization before the fusion.582
This leads to a SR = 0% for the QS = 10 2 when the partial scores are583
quantized before fusing them.584
 Before or after the fusion with a QS = 10 1. With this QS, the system is able585
to stop the attack regardless of the point where the scores are quantized. As586
in the previous case, the attack does not receive the necessary feedback from587
the system on whether it has managed to increase or not the similarity score,588
and thus fails to achieve its objective.589
In both cases listed above, no account is broken, while for the remaining trials590
the SR of the attack is still 100%, only decreasing its Eff (i.e., more comparisons591
are needed to break an account). However, while the performance of the system is592
not considerably affected in the first case (EER = 1.37%), it is barely acceptable593
with a QS = 10 1: the EER is as high as 32.06%.594
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8. Conclusions595
In this work, we have presented and evaluated the first software attack against596
multimodal biometric systems. As case study, we have tested it on a system based597
on face and iris, a trait combination regarded as user-friendly: the features of both598
traits may be extracted from images the can be captured at the same time, being599
the acquisition process transparent to the user. The attacking algorithm shows a600
remarkable performance, thus proving the vulnerabilities of multimodal systems601
to this type of attacks. Furthermore, the multimodal system has not presented602
an improvement in the security level against this kind of attack compared to the603
face and iris modules on their own. This fact confirms what previous studies604
on spoofing attacks pointed out: even though multimodal systems recognition605
performance is higher, they do not necessarily increase the robustness of unimodal606
approaches to external attacks.607
The quantization of the scores given by the matcher is analysed as a possible608
countermeasure. Two different approaches are studied and compared: the partial609
scores can be quantized before fusing them, or the final score can be quantized610
after the fusion. The first scenario leads to a null success rate without affecting611
the verification performance of the system, being thus a suitable countermeasure612
for the proposed attack. The second case also protects the system against the613
attack but at the cost of drastically reducing its verification performance.614
Research works such as the one presented in this article pretend to bring some615
insight into the difficult problem of biometric security evaluation through the sys-616
tematic study of biometric systems vulnerabilities and the analysis of effective617
countermeasures that can minimize the effects of the detected threats, in order to618
increase the confidence of the final users in this rapidly emerging technology.619
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